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Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss
Aversion? An Experimental Analysis
MICHAEL S. HAIGH and JOHN A. LIST∗
ABSTRACT
Two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, have been combined to
provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Recent experimental
evidence supports the theory, as students’ behavior has been found to be consistent
with myopic loss aversion (MLA). Yet, much like certain anomalies in the realm of
riskless decision-making, these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among pro-
fessionals. Using traders recruited from the CBOT, we do indeed find behavioral dif-
ferences between professionals and students, but rather than discovering that the
anomaly is muted, we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with MLA to a
greater extent than students.
ONE MAINSTAY AMONG ECONOMISTS IStheirfascinationwithanomaliesandunsolved
puzzles. Arguably one of the most provocative enigmas in recent years is the eq-
uitypremiumpuzzle:Giventhereturnofstocksandbondsoverthelastcentury,
an unreasonably high level of risk aversion would be necessary to explain why
investors are willing to hold bonds at all (Mehra and Prescott (1985)). Recently,
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) combined two behavioral concepts—loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) and mental accounting (Thaler (1985))—to
provide a theoretical foundation for the observed equity premium puzzle. While
only a few experimental studies have tested Benartzi and Thaler’s myopic
loss aversion (MLA) theory, the results thus far have been quite promising,
as Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997), and Gneezy, Kapteyn, and
Potters (2003) have all observed individual behavior consistent with the MLA
conjecture.
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Yet, in light of some recent studies (e.g., List (2002, 2003, 2004)) that re-
port market anomalies in the realm of riskless decision-making are attenuated
among real economic players who have intense market experience, the current
lot of experimental studies and their support of MLA may be viewed with cau-
tion.1 This point is strengthened given that there are numerous reasons to sus-
pect that financial professionals’ behavior may differ from nonprofessional be-
havior due to training, regulation, etc. (Burns (1985), Holt and Villamil (1986)).
Locke and Mann (2000) take the argument a step further by suggesting that
any research that ignores the use of professional traders is likely to be received
passively because “ordinary” individuals are unlikely to have any substantial
impact on market price since they are too far removed from the price discovery
process.2
As a whole, these arguments suggest that behavior may change significantly
when real market players are put to the task. To explore this issue within
the realm of MLA, we make use of undergraduate students as our experimen-
tal control group, and recruit 54 professional futures and options pit traders
from the Chicago Board of Trade to examine if behavioral discrepancies exist
across subject pools. Using an experimental protocol that is consistent with
the extant literature, we find that professionals do indeed behave differently
from undergraduate students. Yet, instead of displaying behavior inconsistent
with the MLA conjecture, as we had expected, the professional traders exhib-
ited behavior consistent with MLA to a greater extent than undergraduate
students.
These findings, which support evidence from laboratory experiments using
student subjects, may have important asset pricing and modeling implications.
As the literature notes, the presence of MLA suggests that market prices of
risky assets might be significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision
flexibility are reduced. In this sense, institutions may have the ability to influ-
ence asset prices through changes in their information provisioning policies. As
outlined in Gneezy et al. (2003, p. 821), this behavioral phenomenon appears
to be what compelled Israel’s largest mutual fund manager, Bank Hapoalim,
to change its information release about fund performance from every month to
every 3 months, noting that “investors should not be scared by the occasional
drop in prices.”
Theremainderofourstudyproceedsasfollows.Inthenextsection,weprovide
a brief background of MLA and describe our experimental design. In Section II
we report our results. Section III summarizes and concludes the paper.
1 Indeed, Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1984) make an even stronger argument noting that
the experimental literature using students is biased (see also Bonner and Pennington (1991)).
Their main contention is that experimental findings of major anomalies have largely used student
subjects, whereas those few studies that have employed professionals have usually reported perfor-
mance more in line with mainstream theory. This line of argument is also an assumption implicit
in other experimental research (e.g., Frederick and Libby (1986)).
2 If one is interested in market behavior, it is important to recognize that it is behavior at the
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I. Background and Experimental Design
Before becoming immersed in the experimental design, it is important
to highlight what MLA is and why it is important to understand. As
aforementioned, MLA is a behavioral theory that combines loss aversion and
mental accounting. An agent is said to be loss averse if he is more acutely aware
of losses than gains of equal size. More formally, loss aversion is the result of
individuals having a “value function” defined with respect to the status quo.
This value function is positive and concave over gains and is negative, convex,
and more steeply sloped over losses (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Mental
accounting refers to how individuals aggregate choices (explicitly or implicitly).
In particular it refers to how transactions are evaluated over time (how often
portfolios are evaluated) and cross-sectionally (whether they are evaluated as
portfolios or individually). Mental accounting determines both the outcomes of
decisions as well as the framing of those decisions. An agent who frames his
decisions narrowly will tend to make shorter-term choices and an agent who
frames outcomes narrowly will evaluate her losses and gains more frequently
(Thaler et al. (1997)).
If agents evaluate their investments at high frequencies, there may be peri-
ods of time where the return on a risky asset (i.e., stocks) is lower than those
on a safe asset (i.e., bonds), whereas less frequent evaluation might suggest the
opposite. Since losses are weighed more heavily than gains, the high-frequency
evaluation will lead to greater dissatisfaction. If the agent considers perfor-
mance over longer time periods, the riskier asset is likely to outperform the
safer asset, and hence agents will place a higher value on stocks relative to
bonds. An individual is, therefore, myopically loss averse if he evaluates gains
and losses separately as soon as the information is consumed, rather than pool-
ing the returns into a lifetime portfolio.
As an example of how MLA influences individual decision-making, assume
that an agent is loss averse and weighs losses relative to gains at a rate of
δ>1. Suppose also that the agent has a two-thirds probability of losing $1 and
a one-third probability of winning $2.50. The expected utility of the gamble is
thus 1/3(2.5) + δ2/3(−1), which takes on a positive value if δ<1.25. If, on the
other hand, the loss-averse agent evaluates three lotteries in combination, we
may view her expected utility per decision task as follows: 1/27(7.5) + 6/27(4) +
12/27(0.5)+δ8/27(−3),δ2/3(−1),whichispositiveifδ<1.56,effectivelymaking
the individual lottery sequence more attractive to a loss-averse individual than
the aggregate lottery sequence.3
3 To fully appreciate the effect of MLA on risk preferences, we consider an agent who must choose
between a stock with an expected return (and standard deviation) of 7% (20%) per year and a less
volatile stock with a guaranteed 1% annual return. Using the assumptions above, we find that the
appeal of the risky asset will be a function of the time horizon of the investor: An agent willing to
wait longer before evaluating the outcome of the asset will find the stock more attractive than an
equally loss-averse agent who evaluates sooner. Moreover, agents who differ in the frequency with
which they evaluate outcomes will not derive the same utility from owning the stocks. To illustrate,
consider the simple example in Thaler et al. (1997): Assume that the loss-averse utility takes the526 The Journal of Finance
Table I
Experimental Design
Subject Type Treatment F Treatment I
Students 32 32
Traders 27 27
Note: Numbers represent sample sizes. Treatment F had subjects placing bets in nine rounds; after
each round, the subject was informed of the outcome. Treatment I was identical except subjects
placed bets for three rounds at a time rather than for each round. Thus, subjects in Treatment F
received frequent feedback, whereas subjects in Treatment I received infrequent feedback.
A. Experimental Design
To study whether traders exhibit behavior consistent with the MLA conjec-
ture, we used a straightforward 2 × 2 experimental design (see Table I). Be-
causeoneimportantgoalofourresearchwastoexplorewhetheragentswhoare
professional traders exhibited behavior in line with MLA, we used undergrad-
uate students as our experimental control group. Using a between-person ex-
perimental design, we included both undergraduate students and professional
traders in two distinct treatments: Treatment F (denoting frequent feedback)
and Treatment I (denoting infrequent feedback). And to ensure comparability
withtheextantliterature,wefollowedGneezyandPotters(1997)whencrafting
our experimental protocol and parameters.4 In this spirit, our experimental de-
sign should be considered an “artefactual field experiment” (see Harrison and
List (2004)).
In Treatment F, subjects were confronted with a sequence of nine rounds
in which they were endowed with 100 units per round (see below for exchange
rate details). In each of the nine rounds, the subject decided what portion of this
endowment (0, 100) she desired to bet in a lottery that returned two-and-a-half
times the bet with one-third probability and nothing with two-thirds probabil-
ity. As illustrated in the experimental instructions contained in Appendix A,
subjects were made aware of the probabilities, payoffs, and the fact that the
lottery would be played directly after all subjects had made their choices for
that round. Thus, subjects played rounds one by one. Subjects were therefore
awareofthefactthattheycouldearnanywherebetween0and350unitsineach
round. Finally, subjects were informed that monies earned were to be summed
and paid in private at the end of the experiment.
Contrastingwiththis“frequentfeedback”environmentisTreatmentI,which
is identical to Treatment F, except that in Treatment I agents placed their
form U(w) = w for w ≥ 0a n dU(w) = 2.5w for w < 0 (where w denotes the change in wealth and
2.5 is the value of the agent’s loss aversion parameter). Under this scenario, the utility of investing




2 2.5(−13)) if evaluated myopically (one period) compared
to the utility of 1 for the bond. After two periods, however, the utility from owning the stock is
4.25: (
1
4 2( 2 7 )+
1
2 (27 − 13) +
1
4 5( −13)), compared to the cumulative (noncompounded) return
from the bond of 2.
4 Appendix A contains our experimental instructions for student Treatment F, which closely
follow Gneezy and Potters (1997). Instructions for Treatment I are similar to Treatment F, with
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bets in blocks of three. Rather than placing their round bet and realizing the
round outcome before proceeding to the next round, in Treatment I agents
decided in round t how much of their 100-unit endowment they wished to bet
in the lotteries for each of three rounds, t, t + 1, and t + 2. Following Gneezy
and Potters (1997), we restricted the bets to be homogeneous across the three
rounds. Most importantly, after subjects placed their bets, they were informed
about the combined realization of the three rounds. This contrasts with our
assignment of gains and losses after each round in Treatment F, and provides
heterogeneity in the evaluation period.
Previous efforts have shown that this simple framing change can have re-
markable effects on betting behavior. To cite just one example, using Dutch
undergraduate students, Gneezy and Potters (1997) found that the average
percent of endowment bet is significantly greater in the low feedback treat-
ment compared to the high feedback treatment: 67.4% versus 50.5%.
As summarized in Table I, we recruited 64 subjects for our student treat-
ments from the undergraduate student body at the University of Maryland.
Each treatment was run in a large classroom on the College Park campus of
the University of Maryland. To ensure that decisions remained anonymous, the
subjects were seated far apart from each other. The trader subject pool included
54 professional traders from the CBOT.5 Each of the trader treatments was run
in a large room on-site at the CBOT. As in the case of the students, communi-
cation between the subjects was prohibited and the traders were seated such
that no subject could observe another individual’s decision (and payoffs).
Before moving to a discussion of the experimental results, we should men-
tion a few noteworthy aspects of our experimental design. First, all treatments
were run using pencil and paper. After subjects made their decisions and the
lotteryresultswererealized,experimenterscirculatedtoensurethatindividual
payoffs were calculated correctly. Then, the agents made their decision for the
next decision period. Second, whether a participant won or lost in any given
round of the lottery depended on their personal win color. Participants won
if their win color matched the round color that was drawn by the assistant,
and lost if their win color did not match the round color. The outcome of the
random events (the round color drawn) was announced publicly, and subjects
were only aware of their own bets and whether they won or lost (i.e., they
were not made aware of others’ round colors or bets). Third, in the student
treatments, the exchange rate was 1:1 (1 cent for each unit), and in the trader
treatments, the exchange rate was 4:1 (4 cents for each unit). Our decision to
quadruple the stakes for traders was based on a detailed discussion with CBOT
5 We refer to all subjects recruited from the CBOT as traders. However the 54 traders recruited
consisted of locals, brokers, clerks and exchange employees (e.g., floor managers or market re-
porters) who worked in the open outcry environment. We found no statistical difference between
floor participant types, hence we pool participants and collectively call them “traders.” This find-
ing is intuitive since the average nonlocal/broker had accumulated approximately 9 year of floor
experience and many reported to have had several years of experience as either a local or bro-
ker. Finally, the average trader (including nonlocals/brokers) was involved with about 537 traded
contracts daily.528 The Journal of Finance
Figure 1. Comparing betting patterns.
officials about trader earnings.6 Fourth, data for the student (trader) treat-
ments were gathered in four (four) distinct sessions and no subject participated
in more than one treatment.
II. Results
Our key comparative static result is an examination of behavioral differences
across frequent and infrequent treatments between subject types. To maintain
consistency with the previous literature, we begin the empirical analysis by
discussing findings from nonparametric statistical tests. We then extend these
results by discussing empirical estimates from a panel data regression model.
Since MLA predicts that the average bet in Treatment F should be less than
the average bet in Treatment I, we directly compare betting levels in Figure 1,
whichplacesourdataalongsidethedatareportedinGneezyandPotters(1997).
Betting behavior summarized in Figure 1 is consistent with MLA. For in-
stance, while traders bet on average nearly 75 units in Treatment I, they bet
only 45 units in Treatment F. Our student data, which are consonant with the
6 Our student exchange rate is very similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997) after adjusting for
exchange rate differences between the guilder and the U.S. dollar. CBOT officials suggested that
designing a 30-minute game with an expected average payout of approximately $30.00 was more
than a reasonable approximation to an average trader’s earnings for an equivalent amount of
time on the floor (in our experiment, the median trader’s earnings for 25 minutes was about
$40.00). Indeed, postexperimental discussions with the traders indicated that these stakes were
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empirical findings presented in Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Thaler et al.
(1997), exhibit a similar pattern: In Treatment I, students bet on average 62.50
units versus 50.89 units in Treatment F. Yet, the data indicate a curious pat-
tern. While the University of Maryland undergraduate students exhibit behav-
ior that is consistent with MLA, the effect is much less pronounced than the
treatment effect observed among traders.
To assess these differences statistically and provide a sense of the temporal
nature of the betting patterns, we average the amount bet at the individual
level in rounds 1–3, 4–6, and 7–9 for Treatment F (to avoid data-dependency
issues) and compare these data to observations in Treatment I. We present a
summary of the raw data and statistical tests in the upper and lower panels
of Appendix B. The upper panel of Appendix B can be read as follows: Row 1,
column1,attheintersectionof“Rounds1–3”and“TraderTreatmentF,”denotes
that the average trader in Treatment F bet 48.85 (with a standard deviation
of 30.88) units in rounds 1–3. As a comparison, column 2 in this same row
indicates that traders in those same rounds bet 66.22 in Treatment I. Using
a nonparametric Mann–Whitney statistical test, we find that these bets are
significantly different at the p < 0.05 level. This result is contained in the
lower panel of Appendix B at the intersection of “Rounds 1–3” and “Trader
Treatment F versus Treatment I” (z =− 2.19; p = 0.029).
Perusing the summary of empirical results in the lower panel of Appendix
B reveals the strength of the treatment effect among dealers: In every block
of three rounds, traders in Treatment I bet greater amounts than traders in
Treatment F. Alternatively, we only find sporadic statistical significance among
students.7 Thispatternofresultsalsoholdsifweconsidertheaveragebetacross
all rounds (Rounds 1–9): Traders bet 74.29 units in Treatment I and 45.59 in
Treatment F (a difference of 28.7) whereas students bet 62.50 in Treatment
I and 50.89 in Treatment F (a difference of 11.61). Our raw data, therefore,
provide a surprising insight: Professional traders exhibit behavior consistent
with MLA to a greater extent than undergraduate students.
Although analysis of the raw data provides evidence to support this unex-
pected finding, there has been little attempt to control for the panel nature
of our data. To provide a robustness test, we estimate a panel data regression
model in which we regressed the individual bet on a dummy variable for subject
pool, a dummy variable for treatment, their interaction, and unobservable sub-
ject and time effects. Because the subject pool and treatment dummy variables
are static, we report panel data estimates from a random effects regression
model (the rank condition would be violated if we estimated a fixed effects
model).
Empirical results from two specifications are contained in Table II.8 Specifi-
cation (1) is a simple Tobit regression model, while specification (2) augments
this baseline model by including subject and period random effects. Regardless
7 Given the fact that subjects are confronted with an upper (100) and lower (0) bound, the
distribution must be non-normal. Moreover, results from the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test confirm
the non-normality of the data.
8 Note from χ2 tests presented in Table II that both of our models are significant at the p < 0.01









Treatment F −36.7∗ −38.5∗
(4.1) (4.9)
Student∗Treatment F 22.7∗ 13.4∗
(5.5) (6.3)
R2 0.11 0.11
χ2(3 d.f.) 42.1∗ 200.6∗
Subject Random Effects No Yes
Time Effects No Yes
N 1,062 1,062
Notes: Dependent variable is the individual bet. “Trader” is the omitted subject category and
therefore represents the baseline group. Student (Treatment F) is the student (treatment)
indicator variable that equals 1 if the subject was a student (in Treatment F), 0 otherwise.
Student∗Treatment F is the student indicator variable interacted with the frequent feedback
treatment variable. Specification (1) is a Tobit model. Specification (2) is a random effects Tobit
model. The χ2 values provide evidence of the models’ explanatory power. In both cases our model is
significant at the p < 0.01 level. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.
∗ Denotes significance at the p < 0.05 level.
of which empirical assumptions one subscribes to, our estimation results sup-
port the conclusions from the raw data. For example, in specification (2) we find
that traders in Treatment F bet approximately 38.5 fewer units than traders in
TreatmentI,andthisdifferenceissignificantatthep<0.01level.Theevidence
is slightly weaker for students, where Treatment F subjects bet approximately
25 (13.4–38.5) fewer units than students in Treatment I, a noteworthy differ-
ence, but one that is significantly less than the 38.5 unit difference observed
between traders. This finding can be gleaned from the coefficient estimate of
the Student∗Treatment F interaction term in Table II, which is significant at
the p < 0.05 level.9
III. Concluding Remarks
Two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, have recently
been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium
puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)). Although only a few empirical tests have
been carried out to explore the predictive power of the theory (e.g., Thaler et al.
(1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy et al. (2003)), the experimental tests
9 We also included a second part of the experiment whereby subjects bet using their own funds
earned from part 1. We exclude summary statistics of these data to conserve space, but note that
the pattern of results for personal funds is consistent with the betting patterns observed above.
See Appendix A for part 2 instructions.Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? 531
to date have provided results consistent with the theory. Yet, inference from
these experiments is open to criticism because it is based on observing the be-
havior of undergraduate students. This can be problematic because observed
treatment effects among students may not be representative of behavior in
naturally occurring environments, where selection effects may have created
distinct populations of economic decision-makers. Combining this insight with
the fact that some recent field studies (e.g., List (2002, 2003, 2004) indicate that
marketexperienceattenuatescertainmarketanomaliesinrisklesssettings,we
suspect that the current evidence supporting MLA may be viewed with caution.
To provide initial insight into the robustness of the extant literature, we re-
cruited futures and options traders to participate in an experiment. Making use
of undergraduate students as our control group, we find an unexpected result:
While the data suggest that both traders and students exhibit investment be-
havior in line with MLA, traders exhibit this behavior to a greater extent than
students. At a fundamental level, this result is important, since our traders,
who are vital components of the price discovery process, exhibit more evidence
of this type of behavior than any other subject pool that has been evaluated to
date.
Afewnormativeandpositiveimplicationsnaturallyfollow.First,ourfindings
suggest that expected utility theory may not model professional traders’ behav-
ior well, and this finding lends credence to behavioral economics and finance
models, which are beginning to relax inherent assumptions used in standard
financial economics. In a positive sense, these findings have direct implications
on the communication strategies for fund managers, whereby revealing infor-
mation on a less frequent basis means that the likelihood of incurring a loss
is reduced. Moreover, providing less freedom to adjust (i.e., inducing agents to
think in a more aggregated way) might reduce the likelihood that a sell-off en-
sues after a minor setback. This intuition follows Gneezy et al. (2003), who note
that if market information becomes more readily available at a lower cost one
might expect it to be used more often—hence affecting behavior over riskier
assets and therefore relative prices.
Appendix A: Experimental Instructions for Student Treatment F
A.1. Instructions for Part 1
Part 1 of the experiment consists of nine successive rounds. In each round
you will start with an amount of 100 units (1 unit = 1 cent). You must decide
which part of this amount (between 0 units and 100 units) you wish to bet in
the following lottery:
You have a two-thirds chance (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a
one-third chance (33%) to win two-and-a-half times the amount you bet.
You are requested to record your choice on your registration form. Suppose you
decide to bet an amount of X units (100 ≥ X ≥ 0) in the lottery. Then, you must
fill in the amount X in the column headed Amount in lottery, in the row with
the number of the present round.532 The Journal of Finance
Whether you win or lose in the lottery depends on your personal win color.
This color is indicated on top of your individual sheet. Your win color can be
red, blue, or white, and is the same for all nine rounds. In any round, you win
in the lottery if your win color matches the round color that will be drawn by
the assistant, and you lose if your win color does not match the round color.
The round color is determined as follows. After you have recorded your bet
in the lottery for the round, the assistant will, in a random manner, pick one
color from a cup containing three colors: red, blue, and white. The color drawn
is the round color for that round. If the round color matches your win color you
win in the lottery; otherwise you lose. Since there are three colors, one of which
matches your win color, the chance of winning in the lottery is one-third (33%)
and the chance of losing is two-thirds (67%).
Hence, your earnings in the lottery are determined as follows. If you have
decided to put an amount of X units in the lottery, then your earnings in the
lottery for the round are equal to −X if the round color does not match your win
color (you lose the amount bet) and equal to +2.5X if the round color matches
your win color (you win two-and-a-half times the amount bet).
The round color will be shown to you by the assistant. You are requested
to record this color in the column Round colors, under win or lose, depending
on whether the round color does or does not match your win color. Also you
are requested to record your earnings in the lottery in the column Earnings in
lottery. Your total earnings for the round are equal to 100 units (your starting
amount) plus your earnings in the lottery. These earnings are recorded in the
column Total earnings, in the row of the corresponding round. Each time we
will come by to check your registration form for errors in calculation.
After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next round. Again
you start with an amount of 100 units, a part of which you can bet in the
lottery. The same procedure as described above determines your earnings for
this round. It is noted that your private win color remains the same, but that for
each round, a new round color is drawn by the assistant. All subsequent rounds
will also proceed in the same manner. After the last round has been completed,
your earnings in all rounds will be summed. This amount determines your total
earnings for part 1 of the experiment. Then, the instructions for part 2 of the
experiment will be announced.
A.2. Instructions for Part 2
Part 2 of the experiment is almost identical to part 1, but differs in two
respects. First, part 2 consists of three rounds (instead of nine rounds). Second,
in part 2 you do not get any additional starting amount from us. You play with
the money that you have earned in part 1. To that purpose, we first divide your
earnings in part 1 by three. The resulting amount is your starting amount S
for each of the three rounds. Again you are asked which part of this amount
(between 0 and S) you wish to bet in the lottery.
You have a two-thirds chance (67%) of losing the amount you bet and a
one-third chance (33%) of winning two-and-a-half times the amount you
bet.Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? 533
You are asked to record your choice on the registration form. If you decide to
bet an amount of X units (S ≥ X ≥ 0), then you must fill in the amount X under
Amount in lottery.
Your private win color is the same as in part 1 and can be found on top of your
registration form. After you have recorded your bet for the present round, the
assistant will again, in a random manner, pick one color from a cup containing
three colors: red, blue, and white. The color drawn is the round color. If this
round color matches your win color, you win in the lottery, otherwise you lose.
If you have decided to bet an amount X in the lottery, then your earnings in
the lottery are equal to −X if the round color does not match your win color
(you lose the amount bet for the round) and equal to +2.5X if the round color
does match your win color (you win two-and-a-half times the amount bet for
the round).
You are again requested to record the round color and your earnings in the
lottery on the registration form. Your total earnings for the round are equal
to your starting amount S plus your earnings in the lottery. You are asked to
record these on your registration form. We will come by to check your form for
errors.
After that you are requested to make your choice for the next round. Again
you can choose to bet part of your starting amount in the lottery. The same
procedure as described above determines your earnings. Round 3 will proceed
in the same manner. After that, your earnings in the three rounds will be





Trader Trader Student Student
Treatment F Treatment I Treatment F Treatment I
Rounds 1–3 48.85 (30.88) 66.22 (27.50) 42.77 (31.16) 56.50 (25.75)
Rounds 4–6 39.10 (33.11) 75.56 (24.58) 51.77 (30.64) 62.72 (26.69)
Rounds 7–9 48.83 (34.24) 81.41 (22.74) 58.13 (28.52) 68.28 (26.88)
Rounds 1–9 45.59 (32.69) 74.29 (25.49) 50.89 (30.48) 62.50 (26.56)
Mann–Whitney z-Statistics (p-Values)
Trader Student
Treatment F Versus Treatment I Treatment F Versus Treatment I
Nonparametric Statistical Test Results
Rounds 1–3 −2.19 (0.029) −2.35 (0.019)
Rounds 4–6 −3.90 (0.000) −1.48 (0.138)
Rounds 7–9 −3.55 (0.000) −1.45 (0.146)
Rounds 1–9 −3.48 (0.000) −1.82 (0.069)
Notes: Columns 1–4 in the upper panel summarize trader and student betting behavior over
rounds. Columns 1–4 in the lower panel summarize Mann–Whitney tests of the differences in
behavior across treatment type.534 The Journal of Finance
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